



## ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑΓΟΡΑΣ

ΠΡΟΣ : Κυπριακές Επιχειρήσεις Παροχής Επενδυτικών Υπηρεσιών  
ΑΠΟ : Επιτροπή Κεφαλαιαγοράς  
ΗΜΕΡΟΜΗΝΙΑ : 22 Νοεμβρίου 2011  
ΑΡ. ΕΓΚΥΚΛΙΟΥ : ΕΓ144-2011-15  
ΑΡ. ΦΑΚΕΛΟΥ : Ε.Κ. 6.1.14  
ΘΕΜΑ : Ανακοίνωση της Ομάδας Οικονομικής Δράσης (Financial Action Task Force) για χώρες αυξημένου κινδύνου για ξέπλυμα παράνομου χρήματος και χρηματοδότησης της τρομοκρατίας

Σε συνέχεια της Εγκυκλίου ΕΓ144-2011-11 της Επιτροπής Κεφαλαιαγοράς, ημερομηνίας 2 Αυγούστου 2011, σχετικά με το πιο πάνω θέμα, επισυνάπτεται νέα ανακοίνωση της Ομάδας Οικονομικής Δράσης, ημερομηνίας 28 Οκτωβρίου 2011, η οποία συνεχίζει να εκφράζει ανησυχίες για τις σοβαρές ελλείψεις και αδυναμίες που παρουσιάζονται στα μέτρα παρεμπόδισης ξεπλύματος παράνομου χρήματος και χρηματοδότησης της τρομοκρατίας, του Ιράν και της Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της Κορέας. Σημειώνεται ότι, στη νέα ανακοίνωση, έχουν προστεθεί οι Νιγηρία και το Σάο Τομέ και Πρίνσιπε ενώ παραμένουν οι Βολιβία, Κούβα, Αιθιοπία, Κένυα, Μυανμάρ, Σρι Λάνκα, Συρία και Τουρκία, οι οποίες παρουσιάζουν σημαντικές ελλείψεις στο θεσμικό τους πλαίσιο για την καταπολέμηση του ξεπλύματος παράνομου χρήματος και τη χρηματοδότηση της τρομοκρατίας.

Ενόψει των πιο πάνω, οι ΚΕΠΕΥ καλούνται όπως εφαρμόζουν τα αυξημένα μέτρα επιμέλειας που προνοούνται στην παράγραφο 7, του Τέταρτου Παραρτήματος της Οδηγίας ΟΔ144-2007-08 της Επιτροπής Κεφαλαιαγοράς για την Παρεμπόδιση Ξεπλύματος Παράνομου Χρήματος και Χρηματοδότησης της Τρομοκρατίας, σε σχέση με συναλλαγές και επιχειρηματικές σχέσεις με πρόσωπα που προέρχονται από τις προαναφερόμενες χώρες.

Με εκτίμηση

Δήμητρα Καλογήρου  
Πρόεδρος Επιτροπής Κεφαλαιαγοράς

---

## FATF Public Statement - 28 October 2011

---

Paris, 28 October 2011 - The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from ML/FT risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

**Jurisdictions subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the on-going and substantial money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks emanating from the jurisdictions\*.**

Iran

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

**Jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that have not made sufficient progress in addressing the deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the deficiencies\*\*. The FATF calls on its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies associated with each jurisdiction, as described below.**

Cuba\*\*

Bolivia

Ethiopia

Kenya

Myanmar

Nigeria

São Tomé and Príncipe

Sri Lanka

Syria

Turkey

\* The FATF has previously issued public statements calling for counter-measures on Iran and DPRK. Those statements are updated below.

\*\*Cuba has not engaged with the FATF in the process.

### Iran

The FATF, with a renewed urgency, is particularly and exceptionally concerned about Iran's failure to address the risk of terrorist financing and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system, despite Iran's engagement with the FATF.

The FATF reaffirms its call on members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2009 call on its members and urges all

ΣΤΑΣΙΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ 32, 4<sup>ος</sup> ΟΡΟΦΟΣ, Τ.Θ. 24996, ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑ, ΚΥΠΡΟΣ, ΤΗΛ. 22 875475, ΦΑΞ. 22 754671 e-mail:

[info@cysec.gov.cy](mailto:info@cysec.gov.cy) , <http://cysec.gov.cy>

jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran. FATF continues to urge jurisdictions to protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices and to take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by Iranian financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction. Due to the continuing terrorist financing threat emanating from Iran, jurisdictions should consider the steps already taken and possible additional safeguards or strengthen existing ones.

The FATF urges Iran to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies, in particular by criminalising terrorist financing and effectively implementing suspicious transactions reporting (STR) requirements. If Iran fails to take concrete steps to improve its CFT regime, the FATF will consider calling on its members and urging all jurisdictions to strengthen counter-measures in February 2012.

### **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)**

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.

The FATF reaffirms its call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should also protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and risk mitigation practices, and take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by DPRK financial institutions to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.

The FATF remains prepared to engage directly in assisting the DPRK to address its AML/CFT deficiencies, including through the FATF Secretariat.

---

### **Cuba**

Cuba has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it constructively engaged with the FATF. The FATF has identified Cuba as having strategic AML/CFT deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system. The FATF urges Cuba to develop an AML/CFT regime in line with international standards, and is ready to work with the Cuban authorities to this end.

---

### **Bolivia**

Bolivia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting new CFT legislation. However, despite Bolivia's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should work on addressing these deficiencies including by: (1) ensuring adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for

identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

## **Ethiopia**

Despite Ethiopia's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Ethiopia has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Ethiopia should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework and procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Ethiopia to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

## **Kenya**

Despite Kenya's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Kenya has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Kenya should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (3) establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (4) raising awareness of AML/CFT issues within the law enforcement community (Recommendation 27); and (5) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17). The FATF encourages Kenya to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by implementing the AML legislation and setting up its FIU.

## **Myanmar**

Despite Myanmar's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Myanmar has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Myanmar should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) further strengthening the extradition framework in relation to terrorist financing (Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I); (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (5) enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); and (6) strengthening customer due diligence measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages Myanmar to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of

implementing its action plan.

## **Nigeria**

Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting AML/CFT legislation. However, despite Nigeria's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Nigeria has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic deficiencies remain. Nigeria should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring that relevant laws or regulations address deficiencies in customer due diligence requirements and that they apply to all financial institutions (Recommendation 5); and (4) continuing to improve the overall supervisory framework for AML/CFT (Recommendation 23). The FATF encourages Nigeria to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

## **São Tomé and Príncipe**

Despite São Tomé and Príncipe's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, São Tomé and Príncipe has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic deficiencies remain. São Tomé and Príncipe should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II); (2) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); (3) ensuring that financial institutions and DNFBPs are subject to adequate AML/CFT regulation and supervision, and that a competent authority or competent authorities have been designated to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements (Recommendations 23, 24 and 29); (4) implementing effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in order to deal with natural or legal persons that do not comply with the national AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 17); and (5) taking the necessary action to gain membership of GIABA. The FATF encourages São Tomé and Príncipe to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

## **Sri Lanka**

Sri Lanka has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting AML/CFT amendments. However, despite Sri Lanka's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Sri Lanka has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Sri Lanka should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing and addressing the remaining deficiencies with regard to the criminalisation of money laundering (Special Recommendation II and Recommendation 1); and (2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Sri Lanka to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan, including by continuing to work on its AML/CFT legislation.

## **Syria**

Syria has taken significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by improving the legal arrangements for freezing terrorist assets. However, despite Syria's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Syria should work on addressing its deficiencies, including by: (1) adopting adequate measures to implement and enforce the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (Special Recommendation I); (2) implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); (3) ensuring that financial institutions are aware of and comply with their obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to ML and FT (Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV); and (4) ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance (Recommendations 36-38, Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Syria to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

## **Turkey**

Turkey has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by submitting CFT legislation to Parliament. Despite Turkey's high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Turkey has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Turkey should work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Turkey to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.